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THE LEAGUE OF ~ATIONS \ND THE LAWS OF WAR. 
lNTRODUC'l'ION.-Everyone would agree that the renovation of interna-
tional law presents a problem of commanding importance. Diversity of 
opinion is manifested, however, as soon as attention is directed to the details 
of the renovating process. Where to begin, what to emphasize, and how to 
-go about it are questions which provoke a medley of discordant answers. 
Out of this medley a few paramount issues are beginning to emerge. One 
such issue concerns the so-called law of war. What shall be done about it? 
The World War revealed its lack of sanction, its confusion with self-interest, 
its chaotic uncertainty. Can it really be elevated to the dignity of law? 
There are excellent jurists who believe that it can and that the result will 
be worth the effort Others are skeptical. The following paper is without 
doubt one of the most illuminating and significant discussions of the subject 
which has appeared up to the present date. It was first published less than 
a year ago in the British Year Book of International Law. It has attracted 
a great deal of attention in Great Britain, and some attention, although not 
so much as it deserves, in this country. It is reprinted in this issue of Tut 
MICBIGAN LAW Rsvrr:w, with the generous permission of the Editors of the 
Year Book, and also of the publishers, Henry Froude and Hodder & Stough-
ton, in the hope that a real service may be rendered by affording it wider 
publicity among those whose opinions wi11 weigh heavily in influencing the 
decisions to be made.-THt EDITORS. 
T HE second of President Wilson's famous Fourteen Points stip-ulated for the "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas 
outside territorial waters, alike in peace and war, except as the seas 
might be closed in whole or in part by international action for the 
enforcement of international covenants." 
On this point the Allied Powers in agreeing to the Fourteen 
Points as the basis of the terms of Armistice made special and defi-
nite reservations. Perhaps for this reason the freedom of the seas 
never became an issue at the Peace Con£ erence. But at one time it 
nearly did so; and the question is one· which is still sometimes dis-
cussed, and which will certainly be raised again in the near future. 
It is worth while, therefore, to consider more carefully exactly 
what this second point as defined by President Wilson really meant. 
First, it may be pointed out that the absolute freedom of the seas 
in time of peace is agreed to by every one, and has been effectively 
acted upon for a century at least. Second, "the closing of the seas 
for the enforcement of international covenants by a League of Na-
tions" is similarly agreed to, and was embodied by the Peace Con-
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
ference in Article 16 of the treaty. The establishment of the supple-
mentary international law which is required for this purpose, if any 
is required, is in principle at least a simple matter. Therefore, the 
controversial matter on which President Wilson by his second point 
wished to establish legally defined rules is narrowed down to the 
law. of "private" war at sea: the meaning of his point is merely this, 
that he wished to set up a code of rules for the conduct of wars be-
tween individual states undertaken without the sanction of the 
League. In other words, if the second point had been acted upon 
it would have been necessary for the Peace Conference to rewrite 
a large chapter of the laws of war, in exactly the same manner as 
had been done by the Hague Conference in 1907, and as the Confer-
ence of London attempted to do two years later. 
A similar ·but more general proposal, emanating from a weighty 
source in this country, deserves attention. In his book written in 
·1918, Lord Phillimore proposed that the amendment of the laws of 
war and the provision of some meq.ns for their enforcement should 
be part of the work of the Peace Conference, and that when these 
new rules were completed they should be inserted into the final 
treaty. He made this proposal, to quote his own words, "for two 
reasons; first, to make war when it does occur less intolerable than 
the present war has beeµ; secondly, to prevent war by taking away 
from some nations the temptation to rely on their superior capacity 
of committing atrocities ·as an element of success in war." Lord 
Phillimore's proposal had no more success than President Wilson's 
second point as an issue at the Peace Conference; but the idea on 
which both were based, that it was essential for the future that the 
laws of war should be rewritten by an international authority of 
high standing, has not yet been abandoned. The proposal now 
takes the form that the League of Nations should take up the ques-
tion and should continue the work of the Hague Conferences, by 
devoting its attention to the codification of rules for the conduct of 
military operations. The latest exponent of this idea is Mr. Wins-
ton Churchill, who recently said in the House of Commons that the 
use of poison gas in future warfare is a question which should be 
regulated by the League. 
In view of the history of the Hague Conferences, and of the high 
authority behind the proposals which have been quoted, it is worth 
while to examine carefully the motive ideas of Lord Phillimore, who 
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states the proposition more generally and more clearly than any one 
else has done. 
An attempt will be made to consider these ideas, and the con-
clusions deduced from them, from two different points of view ; first, 
in relation to the facts of modem warfare and the nature of modem 
intercourse between nations ; second, in relation to the history of 
.the laws of war and the historical traditions of international juris-
prudence. An attempt will also be made to draw from the consid-
erations put forward certain conclusions as to the future action of 
the League in connection with the subject under review. 
I 
It must be said at once that Lord Phillimore's motive ideas seem 
to spring from a misconception of the whole character of modem 
war. In the first place, it is almost inconceivable that any nation 
which is contemplating a declaration of war would be prevented 
from declaring it by conventional limitations on the use of force 
agreed to in any international code of rules. The only possible case 
is that of Great Britain had she accepted President Wilson's second 
point as it stood. But, in fact, if wars between individual states con-
tinue, no such sweeping limitations of force will be agreed to, for 
they are contrary to the nature of war. In the second place, it is a 
complete misconception to imagine that any future war between 
great Powers (which is the sort of war to which the rules must be 
adapted and which really is the only sort worth consideration) can 
by any laws whatever be rendered "less intolerable" than the late 
war. War is intolerable in proportion to the destruction of life and 
property it affects, and it is certain that if wars between individual 
states continue they will become not less destructive but more so. 
This is a necessary consequence of the application of science to war-
fare, and cannot be prevented except by the prevention of war itself. 
Any future war will be incomparably more intolerable than the late 
war has been. 
This last point may perhaps be carried a little further. As the 
scale of war increases it becomes not merely the function of an 
army or a navy but an effort of the whole of society, so its hard-
ships and horrors must spread to every class of society. The use 
of violence against women and children, especially at sea, caused 
great indignation during the late war, but clearly women and chil-
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dren working in a munitions factory are a legitimate object for 
bombardment, and so are the encampments of Women's Auxiliary 
Forces. Similarly, the increase in the number of aircraft and in the 
size of bombs already developed makes it certain that in the next 
big war the destruction of whole towns by aerial bombardment, as 
complete as their destruction now is by artillery, will be allowed by 
any rules of war that are likely to gain acceptance. Such destruc-
tion will. make the life of the civilian population of a belligerent 
state very much what the life of the soldier in the trenches has been 
in the last five years. Moreover, without exception the most effec-
tive weapon in the late war was the starvation by blockade of the 
whole civilian population of enemy countries. It is certain that if 
wars between individual states continue, the belligerents will not 
give up this weapon. It is therefore a platitude accepted by every 
military thinker that no rules can prevent any future war from dam-
aging civilian populations infinitely more than they were damaged 
during the late war. 
There is a further vital difficulty connected with the protection of 
neutrals in any future war petween individual states. Modern war 
being an effort by th~ whole of society, the whole activity of society, 
including all trade with neutral states, contributes to military suc-
cess. Belligerents have the strongest interest to stop. the whole of 
such trade by their enemy. No law defining neutral rights could be 
devised that would not be broken whenever a belligerent felt strong 
enough to break it. It is for this reason and owing to the interna-
tional interdependence of interests from which it springs that any 
future war will, like the past one, tend to become universal, and it 
is for the same reasons that the neutrals have shown such a striking 
willingness to accede to the League of Nations. 
If, then, the codification of the laws of war can by the nature of 
modern warfare do nothing to better the lot of civilians or to render 
war generally less intolerable than it has been, and if such <:odifica-
tion will not really help either to prevent the outbreak of war or to 
protect the interests of neutral states when it has broken out, the 
drawing up of such rules would seem prima facie to be both a thank-
less and a barren task. Fortunately, the Peace Conference decided 
after slight hesitation that it was not a task that it was worth while 
to undertake. The Conference was right in judging that little good 
could coJlle of any attempt to establish rules which would require 
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a most effective League of Nations for their maintenance before the 
League itself had been established. And even now that the League 
has been established there are other general considerations which 
make it equally doubtful whether the League can any more usefully 
occupy itself 111 codifying the rules of war than the Peace Confer-
ence could do. 
For example, it may well be doubted whether any rules which 
could at present be devised would really be adequate to the conduct 
of the next war. The whole nature of warfare alters with the pro-
gress of invention, and in accordance with that change of nature 
the law, must change too. The late war demonstrated nothing more 
clearly than that the law of sea warfare as it stood in 1914 would 
have been, even had it been observed, totally inadequate to the oper-
ations which it should have controlled. Similarly, no rules of war-
fare at sea drawn up in 1920 could be adequate to the naval opera-
tions of 1940. The future of the hydroplane and of the submarine 
as weapons against me;chant shipping, and that of the aeroplane 
as a carrier of contraband, are by themselves problematic enough 
to make even the attempt to devise such rules almost certainly un-
fruitful. And there is this further consideration= if a fixed code 
of rules were to be drawn up by the League of Nations, and if sub-
sequently invention were to change again the nature of warfare, 
the fixed code of rules which had been established would be worse 
:than none, for no rule which was contrary to the nature of war 
would be observed, and a rule that is not observed only serves to 
discredit the law, and to drag other nations into" a quarrel from 
which they might have kept clear. 
There is a further reason, and a most important one, why the 
codification of the law of war is a task which it is most difficult 
for the League of Nations to attempt. Almost every question con-
nected with the laws of war is necessarily controversial, and for 
the last half century has become increasingly so. But there is no 
part which is so controversial as the relations between belligerents 
and neutrals. Yet this is the centre of the whole code of the law 
of war at sea. If there are not rules effectively to -control the rela-
tions of belligerents and neutrals there is no law of war that is 
worth consideration. Even before the last war this was a subject 
on which agreement was exceedingly difficult to secure. The whole 
matter was discussed at the Hague and parts of it again at the Con-
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ference of London in 1909. The rules which were thus laboriously 
evolved were afterwards rejected by the very Governments which 
drew them up. At the present time, so far as sea warfare at least 
is concern!'!d, there are hardly any accepted principles from which 
discussion could even begin. "It has become apparent," Oppenheim 
wrote in a private memorandum in 1917, "that international law 
concerning the rights of neutrals in sea warfare is entirely unset-
tled." The extreme divergence of the views which would be put 
forward if the subject were raised is illustrated by the fact that 
many people in Great Britain would wish not only not to extend 
the rights of neutrals in the sense proposed by President Wilson, 
but would on the contrary wish to denounce the Paris declaration 
of 1856. The fact of the matter is this, that the interests of a bel-
ligerent with sea power are so sharply in conflict with those of neu-
trals that probably no settlement could be arrived at which would 
be generally accepted. 
The first general proposition which is here put forward is that 
the Governments of the world who have combined to establish the 
League of Nations would make a· disastrous mistake if they pro-
posed to use the new machinery which they have set up to solve 
the old problems connected with the codification of the laws of war. 
';l'he task with which the League of Nations should deal is rather 
the building up of a new body of international law for time of 
peace. There are innumerable problems of international life, in-
numei:able conflicts and coincidences of national interest for which 
an effective body of law is required. It is hardly necessary to men-
tion the questions of communication, transit, of colonial policy, of 
public health, of labour legislation, and of the settlement of dis-
putes for which international law has hitherto failed adequately to 
provide, but which cannot any longer be avoided. 
The second contention which is now put forward, and which will 
be examined further in the second part, is that the failure of inter-
national law to provide solutions to the problems of peace has been 
at least in part due to the fact that the attention of writers and 
statesmen has always been diverted from the law of peace to the 
law of war. This preoccupation with the law of war has not only 
diverted attention from the difficult, but infinitely more important 
problems of peace, it has also rendered comparatively barren efforts 
at international "legislation" which might have led to the best re-
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sults. There is al$o at least a case for thinking that it has under-
mined the whole moral force of international law in the minds of 
people at large. A law, of which the most discussed and the most 
conspicuous part, and of which it was often erroneously asserted 
that the only "real" part, was the law of war, could not command 
much popular respect. Every war produced violations of its rules, 
~nd even more allegations that they had been violated. These viola-
tions left the injured party with no sanction but that of reprisals-
"of no use unless you are the stronger side," as Lord Phillimore has 
said. For these reasons Westlake (Collected Papers, p. 238) holds 
that the rules that control hostilities are the worst and weakest 
part of international law; and yet it is by this worst and weakest part 
that international law ha& always been popularly judged and dis-
credited. 
Of all this, the most unfortunate result is that this diversion of 
attention from the law of peace has left that law seriously inade-
quate to the subject matter it should control. The League of Na-
tions must not delay in taking up the task which this inadequacy 
throws upon it. For in the view taken in this paper it is the chief 
task of the League to remove this inadequacy, and by the develop-
ment of true legal processes, and by the establishment of the author-
ity of international covenants and law in time of peace, to work 
out a stable system for the world. 
;a; 
An attempt will now be made very briefly to sketch the historical 
background of the two main contentions put forward in the first 
part, namely, that the preoccupation of writers and statesmen with 
the laws of war has been a real obstacle to the progress of interna-
tional law, and that it is by the development of the law of peace, 
rather than by renewing the attempts to codify the law of war, that 
a stable international system can be built up by the League of Na-
tions. 
* * * * 
It was the great work of Grotius which first established the pre-
dominance of the laws of war in the study and eXposition of inter-
national law. That Grotius himself should have thought the laws 
of war of paramount importance is explained by the motive which 
made him devote his labours to "the noblest part of jurisprudence." 
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That motive he thus explains: "I, holding it to'be most certain that 
there is among nations a common law of rights which is of force 
with regard to war and in V>'.ar, saw many and grave causes why I 
should. write a work on that subject. Ftlr I saw prevailing through-
out the Christain world a licence in making war of which even bar-
barous nations would have been ashamed; recourse being had to 
arms for slight reason or no reason; and when arms were once 
taken up all reverence for divine and human law was thrown away, 
just as if "men were thenceforth authorised to commit all crimes 
without restraint." (Whewell's Translation, Preliminaries, par. 28.) 
Grotius' motive, then, in laying the foundations of the modern 
law of nations was to mitigate the horrors of the wars which in his 
_ day ravaged Europe. It was natural, therefore, that the scheme 
of his book (Preliminaries, pars. 32-5) should show war as the 
basis or the source of almost all his reflections and studies. It was 
this characteristic of his book which established among exponents 
of jurisprudence the tradition, which has survived 'to the present 
day, that the chief function of ~temational law and the sphere in 
which it achieves most indisputably real "positive" existence, are 
both to be found in the laws of war. 
The reasons why this tradition was established so firmly, and 
has endured so long, are the following. In the first place, Grotius 
achieved a brilliant success in the object for which he wrote. Not 
only did his work have a great lite.rary success, but it was the cause 
of an immediate and permanent improvement in the practices of 
war. The atrocities of the Thirty Years' War were not reproduced 
in the wars of the next two centuries after he wrote ; and war being 
then conducted by small armies, the misery it inflicted when those 
armies regulated their conduct in accordance with his rules of hu-
manity, was very greatly reduced. This positive success made the 
moral force of the laws of war loom very large in the minds of 
jurists, statesmen, and peoples. 
Secondly, the enormous personal authority of Grotius himself 
caused most of his successors to follow closely the path he had 
marked out. His work in itself was so much better and so much 
more complete than anything that had preceded it, and than· almost 
anything that came after it for a very long time, that his authority 
remained almost decisive, and even yet is not without weight. And 
his indirect influence has been even greater than his direct authority. 
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For he wrote as a scholar and a lawyer, but he achieved the work of 
a statesman ; and throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies the weight of his own words was reinforced by that of in-
numerable mediocre writers, not without fame in their own day, who 
were content to paraphrase and reproduce what he had created. 
Thirdly, there is this important fact to remember: that in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the relations between nations 
in time of peace were very much more infrequent and unimportant 
than they are today. Their relations through war, whether as bel-
ligerents or neutrals, were a very much larger part of the whole of 
their intercourse than such relations are in the twentieth century. 
It was natural, therefore, that the law of war should present itself 
as the most important subject for legal regulation between states 
to all who concerned themselves with international relations. 
These causes established the Grotian tradition so securely that it 
dominated the growth and development of international law through-
out the nineteenth century. That it should have done so was con-
trary to the essential facts of the nature of international society, and 
contrary to the dictates of reason: for all the three causes above 
described ceased in the nineteenth century to hold good. 
In the first place, in the nineteenth century, war so increased in 
scale and in destructiveness, that the contribution made to human 
welfare by the laws of war, while still considerable and ·by no means 
to be discounted, was yet negligible compared to what it had been. 
The rules of Grotius in his own day enormously reduced the suffer-
ing caused by an outbreak of war; but their efficacy was reduced by 
the inventions and development brought by every decade of the last 
century, until today no rules can prevent war from being infinitely 
more intolerable every time that it occurs. 
In the second place, the authority of no one classical writer 
should in the nineteenth century have exercised the decisive influ-
ence which Grotius, directly or indirectly, exercised on international 
law. There was a great body of literature, and a great number of 
jurists who studied it; there was a large amount of custom and 
usage; there was material for great progress in the science and prac-
tice of international law, had there been a modern Grotius to effect 
it-some one with a great statesman's view of international law and 
with a great statesman's power of gaining acceptance for new con-
ceptions and new obligations. It was against reason; therefore, 
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that the Grotian tradition should have continued to dominate the 
science of international law. 
In the third place, the improvement of communications and the 
growth of international commerce and exchange so intensified the 
intercourse between nations that their war-relations became com-
paratively an insignificant part of the whole". This growth of inter-
course demanded a corresponding growth in the international law 
of peace-a growth which, had it been adequate, would have ren-
dered the law of war comparatively insignificant. But it was not 
adequate; there was a growth of law indeed, and much of the 1r.-
creased ·intercourse was regulated by Convention; but the law of 
peace lagged far behind .the requirements it should have fulfilled, 
and the growth of interests and opinion which it should have re-
flected. 
This last-mentioned shortcoming was the more remarkable in 
that the. nineteenth -century added to custom and reason as sources 
of international law, the method of international "legislation" by 
Conferences of States. This began at the Congress of Vienna and 
developed fitfully until Hague Conferences devoted themselves ex-
clusively to the work of codifying and creating law to govern inter-
national relations. This method of legislation latterly became the 
most important source of international law ; it was certainly the most 
spectacular, and had it produced good results, it might have added 
enormously to the legal value and to the moral authority of inter-
national law. 
It might have been expected that this method of ''legislation" 
would have produced attempts to deal by general rules with the great 
problems that absorbed the energies and attention of the whole 
world during the nineteenth century. There was material enough 
for law: the extraordinary development of colonisation in uncivil-
ised parts of the world, the growing international solidarity of eco-
nomic interests, the increasing cost and destructiveness of war, and 
the consequent increasing importance of preventing its outbreak, 
were all matters that seemed to demand the creation of rules. And 
in fact attempts were made to deal with them by Conference Legis-
lation. The problems of colonisation produced some declarations 
about the slave trade, and much later some discussion of native 
rights and some regulation of colonial traffic in arms and liquor. 
The problems of commerce produced rules about the common rights 
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of the Society of States over international rivers and inter-oceanic 
canals-though in the development of these rules Conference Leg-
islation played a smaller part than might have been expected. The 
problem of war produced some rules of doubtful value about re-
course to mediation, and some machinery established at the Hague 
to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
· But the principles underlying these rules were never worked out 
by the Conferences that enunciated them; they were left to develop 
by the slow growth of custom-or not to develop, as the case might 
be. It was the Grotian tradition that really dominated the use 0£ 
Conference Legislation. As against the meagre and spasmodic 
treatment just indicated of the great problems of peaceful inter-
course, the method of Conference Legislation was used to codify, 
confirm and amend drastically and repeatedly the laws of war on 
sea and land. The following list of Conference Conventions on the 
laws of war may be compared with the sparse "peace" results above 
referred to-
1856. Declaration of Paris on Maritime Law in time of war. 
1864. Declaration of St. Petersburg forbidding the use of certain 
arms. 
1868. Geneva Convention for the protection of the sick and 
wounded. 
1868. Geneva Convention :-Additional Articles. 
1906. Geneva Convention :-Amendment and extension. 
1899. "Peace" Conference at the Hague: one Convention dealt 
with the peaceful settlement of international disputes; 
two Conventions and three Declarations dealt with the 
Law of War. 
1907· Second "Peace" Conference at the Hague: two Conven-
tions dealt with the Law of Peace, eleven Conventions 
and one Declaration dealt with the Laws of War on 
Land and Sea. 
1SJ09. Declaration of London on the Laws of War at Sea. 
It is perhaps worth while to inquire why the method of Confer-
ence Legislation was applied with so much more persistence and 
thoroughness and apparent success to the law of war than to the 
infinitely more important problems of the law of peace. 
Westlake explains the amelioration of the laws of war by the 
operation of two moral forces. "The cause of this rapid career of 
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improvement," he writes, "must be something more than the re-
newed belief in a commonwealth of mankind which has been men-
tioned above- as marking our time. * * * Along with the renewal 
of that belief there has come a remarkable development of the senti-
ment of pity, ·of an enthusiasm of humanity which has caused a 
wider and keener sympathy with suffering than has perhaps ever 
before been known" (Collected Papers, pp. 278-9). 
Now it may be remarked that both these moral forces might have 
found their expression in the improvement of the law of peace 
quite as logically as in that of the law of war. "A renewed belief 
in the commonwealth of mankind" and an "enthusiasm of human-
ity" might both have led to legislation for :the better treatment of 
native races or to international legislation for the improvement of 
labour conditions, or to laws for the prevention of war. Indeed, it 
is remarkable that they did not. For there were other moral forces 
at work in the nineteenth century tending in the same direction. 
There was, for example, the wave of philanthropic feeling which 
swept England on the subject of the slave trade. And there was a 
widespread and persistent desire, springing from the renewed be-
lief in the commonwealth of mankind and attested by the repeated 
recourse to settlement of international disputes by-arbitration and 
by the calling of the Hague Conferences, to improve international 
law for its own sake, to regulate international relations on the basis 
of justice, and to build up a legal system which would replace force 
by law as the final arbiter of nations. 
But all these forces were swept into the improvement of the laws 
of war. When they touched any concrete problem of international 
peace relations they led usually to the enunciation of some broad 
general principle; but this principle was not worked out into a com-
prehensive and practical system of law. Take, for example, the 
treatment of native races. In Annex 15 of the Treaty of Vienna 
· there was a·general declaration against the slave trade, which was 
condemned then as now by the conscience of the civilised world, 
and during the nineteenth century the same moral forces led ·to the 
abolition of ·slavery in various parts of the world. Not until the 
Berlin and Brussels Acts, however, was the principle of the Vienna 
Declaration even discussed internationally again. And then it led 
to some international Conventions, the inadequacy of which has 
been illustrated by the whole of subsequent African history. This 
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failure cannot be attributed to the lack of moral forces-Westlake 
himself is witness that they existed. Nor is it due to the fact that 
problems of colonial administration did not attract the attention of 
statesmen-in fact, every government with colonial possessions was 
perpetually preoccupied with such problems. Nor is it due to the 
lack of a real interest to be served-international agreements on the 
lines of the mandates now proposed might have done much to pro-
mote the true welfare of both white men and their native subjects. 
Westlake attributes the failure of international law to deal more 
effectively with the slave trade to the prevalent exaggerated idea of 
national independence (Peace, p. 323). This is another way of say-
ing that it was due to a failure to apprecia;te the true function of 
international law. Statesmen and lawyers did not envisage the uses 
of international law for the prevention of suffering and abuse in 
time of peace; and Westlake's moral forces were diverted to en-
deavors to prevent abuse in time of war. 
Similar illustrations may be taken from other parts of the his-
tory of international relations in the nineteenth century. The Con-
gress of Vienna laid down a fundamental principle as to the rights 
of non-riparian states on international rivers. This principle in-
deed has had much recognition and some development during the 
last hundred years. But no international Conference has ever en-
deavored to "legislate" for its extension to straits, canals, ports and 
railways. Yet if the principle were valid in one sphere, it sh9uld 
have been extended to the others ; and the immense growth of inter-
national commerce might have been expected so to extend it. Such 
extension would have been in the interests, not of landlocked states 
only, but of every state in the interdependent community of na-
tions; it is an extension which the League of Nations will have to 
bring about and which it has indeed already begun to consider. 
Again, Article 8 and Protocol 23 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 
introduced into international law certain rudimentary rights of med-
iation by third parties in disputes which threaten an outbreak of 
war. These rights were much used in connection with the Eastern 
Question; Sir Thomas Erskine Holland has much of interest to say 
about them. But they were scarcely mentioned in International 
Conferences until 1899; and neither Hague Conference gave them 
any substantial development. Yet one of the basic facts of inter-
national society was that a war between two states was of vital inter-
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est to other states. Had the system of Conference Legislation been 
used as it might have been used, it would have so developed the 
rudimentary principle of 1856 that third parties would have been 
given not only an absolute right, but even a duty, to meditate and 
to enforce consideration and delay before any individual state threw 
international society into confusion by declaring war. Surely the 
prevention of war was as true ?-n international interest as the pre-
vention of abuse during war, and surely it was one which called as 
urgently for agreed regulation by Conference Legislation. Yet it 
is only after the Great War that those principles have been embod-
ied in the Covenant of the League of Nations which should have 
logically developed from what was recognized and enshrined in a 
treaty sixty years ago. 
Had international law developed as it is above suggested that it 
might have done, it is conceivable that the Great War might have 
been averted; it is even conceivable that the League of Nations 
might have come about by evolution instead of revolution. The 
failure of international law is due to many a powerful cause; no 
law. can outstrip the moral standci.r-Os of the mass of those who are 
subject to it. But, in part at least, it is due to the failure of the 
statesmen and jurists of the last century to use the moral forces of 
their day for the development of international law along the lines 
of true progress; and this in turn, it has been argued, is due to their 
preoccupation with the laws of war. It is for the statesmen and 
jurists of our day to bear this lesson continually in mind, and to 
.apply it in the use they make of the new international machinery of 
the League. 
